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24 OCT 1958

Honorable Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Gordon:

In response to your letter of 17 October, I am enclosing
two copies of our comments on the validity of the statements
made by Hanson Baldwin on 10 October 1958.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Enclosure:
Comments on Baldwin article

ORIGINATED BY:

Acting Chief, NED/SI

CONCURRENCES:

Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence

Deputy Director/Intelligence

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OSI/NED: ☐ (23 Oct 58)

22 October 1958

COMMENTS ON BALDWIN ARTICLE

In the New York Times of 18 October 1958, Hanson W. Baldwin wrote of the alleged concern among officials in the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission about the accuracy of Soviet announcements dealing with U.S. nuclear tests. He also stated these same officials believe that Soviet knowledge was derived by leaks or espionage.

The Soviet announcement of the detection of 32 U.S. tests was undoubtedly based on monitoring of U.S. communications. A number of the tests were of such low yield as to almost certainly preclude their detection by long range detection methods. Furthermore, two of the announced test dates were false with no nuclear test having occurred. On the second of these dates, a small (112 pounds) High Explosive charge was exploded. On the other date, a nuclear test was scheduled, but cancelled at the last moment. However, the Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting the tests reports that on both of these dates a normal count-down was conducted, such count-downs being carried in the clear by radio communications to all the ships and installations supporting the Task Force. From other information furnished by the JTF, it is clear that the Soviets would have encountered very little difficulty in monitoring the internal communication system at the proving ground. Searches conducted by the JTF to clear the test area were primarily

for safety reasons and were not directed toward detecting undersea craft. Even if a submarine stayed outside the test restricted zone, it could have been well within the general range of the local communications system. One additional item in support of the likelihood that the USSR information came from communication monitoring is the fact that one U.S. test, conducted on 26 July, was announced in Moscow within twenty-four hours after detonation. It is doubtful that espionage could have provided such rapid transmission of information.

As reported by Mr. Baldwin, officials in the Pentagon and the AEC are undoubtedly concerned about the Soviet announcements dealing with United States tests, although the announcements are partially inaccurate, but the further allegation that these officials believe that the Soviet knowledge was derived by leaks or espionage, is probably not shared by responsible officials of the Pentagon and AEC who have full knowledge of the conditions under which U.S. oversea nuclear tests are conducted.

Our conclusion would be that the Soviet information came from official U.S. announcements about the test series, open broadcasts made for safety reasons announcing closed and restricted areas for surface ships and aircraft at specific times and dates, and finally from monitoring of the JTF count-down communications from a point inside or immediately adjacent to the restricted area surrounding the test site.

U.S. AIDES SUSPECT ATOM-TEST SPYING BY SOVIET UNION

**Accuracy in Listing Pacific
Blasts Ascribed to Means
Other Than Detection**

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Officials in the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission have expressed concern about the accuracy of Soviet announcements dealing with United States nuclear tests.

There are two reasons for this concern.

Experts maintain that the impression given by the accuracy of the Soviet announcements—that a detection system for nuclear tests is virtually foolproof—is contrary to fact.

They assert that the Russians could not possibly have detected all the tests they correctly announced by any form of instrumental detection known to the United States. They point out that the United States monitoring system, which has detected many Soviet tests not announced by Moscow, was unable to detect all of the United States tests held during Operation Hardtack at the Pacific proving grounds from late April through July.

The second cause for concern is a corollary to the first one: officials believe that the Soviet knowledge of the number of United States tests was derived by leaks or espionage.

The concern of the United States officials dates back to a Soviet announcement on Aug. 23 that the United States had detonated a total of thirty-two nuclear devices in the Pacific tests instead of the fourteen officially announced. The Soviet figure was almost correct.

Leaks Are Suspected

Some informed officials do not believe that Soviet observation stations detected all the thirty-two tests, which were listed by time and date. These officials believe that "leaks" to the press or espionage gave Moscow its accurate knowledge of the Soviet detection system. It was disclosed by Lieut. Gen. Arthur J. Trudeau, the Army's Chief of Research and Development, on Sept. 16 to the American Society for Industrial Security.

General Trudeau said then that the "advanced state of Soviet technology today is due more to Soviet success in espionage and subversion than it is to their scientific apparatus, good as it is."

He added that "I wish I could speak out even more strongly on this subject, using some recent cases we know of . . . But I am unable to do so in a public address at this time."

The United States officials say that some of the tests conducted in the Pacific were at very high altitude, some were under water, others were of very small yield, with radioactivity reduced to the minimum. They contend that tests of

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U.S. AIDES SUSPECT ATOM-TEST SPYING

(Continued From Page 1)

small-yield devices can be and have been concealed successfully.

The question of the number of tests conducted by the United States was again emphasized this week by the Russians when Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, announced in the United Nations that the Soviet Union would continue testing until it equaled the number of tests conducted by the West since last March 31.

If the Russians choose to go through with this plan, it would mean at least forty-three more detonations, which is the approximate number of tests conducted by the United States and Britain since March 31.

In the meantime the United States has started another series, Operation Deadline in Nevada, which will add seven more tests to the three already conducted there.

Since testing of nuclear devices started shortly after World War II, the United States has

detonated about 140, the Soviet Union about sixty, and Britain twenty-one. Some tests by the Soviet Union and the United States have been suspected.

The technical feasibility of a nuclear monitoring system, as already proved by tests so far conducted, is one of the reasons why some United States officials are worried about the results of last summer's Geneva conference on the feasibility of detection.

The officials fear that the public impression is that a fool-proof system is possible and desirable. There is also worry in the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission about the effects of any agreed cessation of nuclear testing, a topic scheduled to be discussed with the Russians in Geneva starting Oct. 31.


In this connection, United States officials called attention to an article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, by Henry A. Kissinger, entitled "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace."

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22 OCT 1958

BRIEF FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on Baldwin Article of 10 October 1958

The attached correspondence for your signature contains our comments on the validity of the statements made by Hanson Baldwin on 10 October with respect to atomic test spying by the Soviet Union.



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HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

Attachment:
Draft Ltr to Gordon Gray

cc: DDCI
DD/I
AD/CI

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 17, 1958

Dear Allen:

In a meeting yesterday with the President, I indicated to him that you were looking into the validity of the statements made by Hanson Baldwin in his piece in the New York Times of October 10 with respect to atomic test spying by the Soviet Union.

The purpose of this note is to express the hope that you will keep me informed.

Sincerely,



Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

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STF 7 And Hall Bldg 16 Room 1085

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